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Resumo
Redes Mesh sem fios são apresentados como uma solução cooperativa de baixo custo para conec-
tividade sem fios, com inúmeras aplicações em áreas como empresas, casas, desastres, emergên-
cias ou transportes. De forma a fornecer conectividade, routing tem sido estudado extensivamente,
no entanto a segurança tem sido negligenciada pela investigação, deixando vulnerabilidades que
podem ser exploradas por utilizadores maliciosos. Consequentemente munir os utilizadores com
mecanismos de segurança resistentes aos tipos de ataques mais comuns em redes sem fio é crítico.
Com o objectivo de fornecer anonimização na descoberta e privacidade na comunicação,
soluções de segurança para sistemas foram pesquisadas tentando encontrar o melhor de cada e
combiná-las no segurança de uma aplicação de chat. Com o intuito de projectar e implementar um
protocolo de segurança totalmente descentralizada para aplicações em rede sem fios, onde os nós
móveis conseguem comunicar em segurança, sem a certificação do servidor, através do protocolo
XMPP serverless.
A partir de uma combinação inspirada das soluções analisadas e a inclusão de alguma ino-
vação, um esquema de segurança de autenticação mútua foi projectado que faz uso do número
de telefone como informação chave previamente compartilhada. Para identificar e proteger os
utilizadores, password security usando stretch e salt são combinadas num esquema de autenti-
cação que filtra os utilizadores conhecidos na rede e estabelece com eles comunicações seguras.
Ao mesmo tempo os utilizadores mantêm-se anónimos com a utilização de um pseudónimo rela-
cionado com a sua identidade.
Usando o software livre Android foi desenvolvida uma aplicação de chat para WMN com base
em serverless XMPP implementando mecanismos de segurança descentralizada que permitem
aos utilizadores comunicar de forma segura com um desempenho muito bom. Este excelente
experiência de utilizador é fornecida através de um projecto cuidadoso das funções que, ao mesmo
tempo, previne ataques contra a privacidade do utilizador.
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Abstract
Wireless Mesh Networks are presented as a low cost cooperative solution for wireless connectiv-
ity, having numerous applications in areas as businesses, homes, disaster, emergency or transport.
In order to provide connectivity, routing has been studied extensively, however security has been
neglected by research, leaving vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious users. Conse-
quently arming users with security mechanisms resistant to common types of wireless networks
attack is critical.
Aiming to provide anonymity in discovery and privacy in communication, systems security
solutions were researched trying to find the best of each to combine into securing a chat appli-
cation. Intending to create and implement a fully distributed security protocol for wireless mesh
applications, where mobile nodes are able to safely communicate, without a server certification,
through serverless XMPP protocol.
From an inspired combination of analysed solutions and the inclusion of some innovation a
mutual authentication security scheme was designed that makes use of the phone number as the
key pre-shared information. To identify and secure users, password security using stretch and
salt are combined into a authentication scheme that filters the known users in the network and
establishes secure communications with them. At the same time users remain anonymous with the
use of a pseudonym linkable to their identity.
Using open source android there was developed a chat application for WMN based on server-
less XMPP and implementing decentralized security procedures that enable users to communicate
safely with very good performance. This excellent user experience is provided through careful
design of the functions that at the same time prevent attempts on user privacy.
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Introduction
1.1 Context
Wireless Mesh Networks are a dynamic and cost effective solution for wireless device connec-
tivity. As can be found on [1] mesh networks are formed by a net of nodes enabled with ad-hoc
connectivity, therefore creating multipath solution for packet sending. This solution provides the
network infrastructure with some redundancy, as any node is connected to every node, increasing
availability and resistance to failure or disconnection of nodes. The smart allocation of resources
allows for the sharing of devices bandwidth with other nodes which increases the overall band-
width and spectral efficiency, hence improving overall performance. Multi hop communication
together with decentralized control makes possible for a mesh network to operate without back-
bone or any other network connectivity within a significant range.
All these advantages do not come without a cost and so dynamic complex routing is required
to execute the decentralized control. WMN has the need for a self organising and addressing
routing protocol, a challenge due to the constant mutations of the network. The independence
and autonomy make this topology ideal in a big number of applications used in civil, military and
business applications. We can see mesh networks on residential buildings and company’s offices
as an internet dissemination solution. An example of this distribution of network, open mesh, is
a secure, low cost and scalable solution for internet infrastructure and deployment. WMN can
also be found in manufacturing facilities and retail stores, where sensors and other devices form
the network. On sensor networks, zigbee is a widespread mesh solution that consists in wireless
sensors, which collect data in diverse environments ranging from commercial to industrial.
With the rise of smartphone market share and mobile data consumption, network providers and
general users search for a solution to decrease both costs and in the case of providers also network
overload. The traditional solution is transferring data traffic to wireless networks which due to
their indoors and domestic nature can prove a challenge. Mesh networks provide a alternative
wireless solution for deviating communication traffic. When using them to connect, each actor’s
resources are available throughout the WMN, hence providing access to free data traffic for all
the participants. Together with the growth of chat applications through IP, that make use of the
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data plan instead of the traditional text messages. A message application compatible with WMN
becomes the missing piece to connect people for free. Whether at university, a conference or
even a cafe, this chat application will provide users with a free communication solution for a
location based interaction. Disaster scenarios that overload or damage cell network can be another
interesting application.
Although the number of applications for WMN has experienced some growth, it can be in-
ferred, from the lack of a standard or even common security procedures, that security is still an
unresolved issue for WMN, this is where our solution comes in. Security is not only for the obses-
sive ones or intelligence agencies, the average user should be able to use a service feeling secure
and comfortable without then facing the consequences of security weaknesses. We intend to se-
cure an application in a way that communication quality is not impacted and users can talk freely
without privacy concerns.
1.2 Motivation
WMN use has experienced growth in recent years, a constantly increasing number of applications
shows that users’ motivation is high while operators stay sceptical due to their inability to find a
way to profitably charge this sort of service or just reduce their costs by using or providing them.
A increasing number of systems choose to use WMN for communication in the most diverse
areas such as: emergency and disaster scenarios, tunnels, oil rigs, transportation systems, building
automation, high speed video, VoIP Quality of Service, MANET, Metropolitan Area Networks,
Enterprise networks as well as Health and Medical shows the versatility and adaptability of WMN.
Programs like One Laptop per Child and Open-Mesh are good examples on how mesh can serve
very different purposes.
WMN have experienced some evolution but network security has been mildly neglected from
most of the evolution. The low security level discourages not only users but also operators from
using this network solution, hence making security an essential and critical part of network plan-
ning and protocol developing. Moreover, late attempts at security configuration are extremely
expensive and a lot harder to implement.
For users, whether you are exchanging bank account information or just setting up a date,
you probably do not want other people snooping around your business. Moreover, if you join a
network you only want to interact with your acquaintances, therefore you want to be anonymous
from the network perspective but at the same time recognisable by known users. Not only that, but
there is the need for service availability, prompt response to requests, as well. Furthermore both
the behaviour of the service should be reliable, not have discrepancies from the expected, and the
data you exchange should remain unaltered, regarded as the essential for computer security in [1].
Security liabilities can be found on a network like a WMN. Being a wireless network, packets
flow freely by the propagation mean allowing any device within range to retrieve them. Other
compromising factors arise from a limited physical protection of the devices, that constitute net-
work nodes, together with high link vulnerability. Besides WMN possess connectivity of sporadic
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nature, as a result of the network topology being very dynamic, in other words changing very
drastically and very quickly along time.
For all this, malicious users have opportunities to produce a series of attacks that jeopardise
communication integrity making users liable to weird behaviours, both of the network itself and
other devices. In a dramatic scenario, this could mean that a user has a private conversation
compromised or even that a mobile is acting under someone else’s identity, in both cases it could
mean a lot of trouble to an innocent user.
The focus of the work will be on application behaviour, more precisely authentication of users
by identity and protection of the messages integrity and its content. This will prevent imperson-
ation attacks, message replay and eavesdropping that constitute the concerns of application level
security.
1.3 Objectives
To start out, a review of the state of the art literature will be done and study of security models for
WMN communications. Then it will be designed a security scheme to provide WMN application
and its users with privacy in communications and anonymity in discovery.
The development should be provided on top of a specific environment created by an existing
ad-hoc network creation software, already used on other projects by the Instituto Telecomuni-
cacoes [2] . The developed application should include the functionalities of message exchange
between network peers. Messaging will be accomplished by the use of serverless XMPP protocol,
which is lightweight and very efficient. This makes use of DNS service discovery and multicas-
tDNS.
The security protocol developed intends to be resistant to several known attacks therefore de-
creasing vulnerabilities against malicious users or devices. The objective is to keep as safe as
possible interaction and information of users, by achieving confidentiality and privacy. At the
same time, network efficiency will be maintained, by balancing the tradeoff between security and
overhead. The design will take into account the performance aspects of the various cryptographic
algorithms. The implementation intends to apply the acquired knowledge and certify its applica-
bility in a real scenario.
In order to achieve the intended goals we propose the following objectives:
• Review state of the art literature and study security models for WMN communications
• Design of a security model for WMN Application
• XMPP chat application
• Security scheme implementation
• Analyse results and draw conclusions from the work done
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1.4 Document Structure
Besides introduction this dissertation contains 5 more chapters. The next, Chapter 2, contains
the state of the art information about the theme. We will start on the WMN detail focusing on
its relevant characteristics with emphasis on security. Following then for the analysis of security
and cryptography with focus on tools and models used for centralized and decentralized network
management. Lastly, XMPP is analysed.
In Chapter 3, the scheme design and development is elaborated. We specify its components
and detail the procedures and parts they take in the networks interaction. Justifying the choice for
the different components we aim to provide a good theoretical understanding of the scheme and
how it works.
In Chapter 4, the implementation of the XMPP chat application with security is explained in
detail. Commencing on the construction of an Android chat application and its components. Fin-
ishing with the android limitations and specificities to the algorithm and elements of the security
implementation.
For the analyses of results in Chapter 5, the data collected is explored, together with its rele-
vance in the work done and coherence with design and objectives.
Lastly, Chapter 6 conclusions are drawn from the developed work and results, finalizing with
proposals on future work.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
In the following sections we will present a revision on relevant subjects to the dissertation and their
respective bibliography, making the future work more educated and informed. We will provide a
view of WMN specificities as well as a characterization of Network Security and Cryptography
thought relevant. Security solutions to our specific work context will be explored, taking a glance
at centralized algorithms and reviewing decentralized ones. Lastly XMPP protocol will be detailed
in preparation for the implementation.
2.1 Wireless Mesh Networks
A detailed description about WMN and its characteristics can be found in [3]. WMN is a topology
enabled by wireless ad-hoc type connectivity, as portrayed in Figure 2.1 where nodes form mesh
connections - hops - assigned by technology independent routing.
Figure 2.1: WMN topology
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Compatible with most widespread wireless technologies, WMN represent a very economical
and scalable solution that allows users to communicate for a great range using multiple hops within
the network. The economic advantage guaranteed by WMN has to do with the great resource
maximization made possible by the high bandwidth and spectral efficiency used, where users can
use the same portion of the bandwidth spectrum on different parts of the network by frequency
hoping according to neighbours. Also the multi-hop communication creates greater range and
improves availability as a result of increased path redundancy. Furthermore WMN are independent
of the connectivity technology, this can make for numerous configurations ranging from traditional
wifi, the most common, to bluetooth or even low frequency radio, for greater distances, leading to
the creation problem oriented solutions with wide diversity and complexity of solutions.
All nodes have a dual functionality of server and client that requires them to forward other
nodes messages while sending and receiving their own. Consequently there is a need for encour-
agement of cooperative behaviour. Hence a cooperation compromise has to be made between the
node’s self interest and global ones. Since every node depends on the rest the network one node’s
misbehaviour may jeopardised resource fairness as well as security which can lead to the compro-
mise of user sensitive information. For instance when node A wants to communicate with B, like
we see in Figure 2.1, the intermediary devices must neglect their own tasks to forward the incom-
ing packets not addressed to them, if any of the nodes in the path fails to fulfil this task message
will not be delivered to the destination or in worst cases can be compromised towards a malicious
node.
WMN are designed in a way that every device is independent and promotes scalability, avail-
ability and robustness [4], some of the biggest challenges, in order to achieve this there is the need
for self-management, self-organizing and self-configuration ,to provide further reduction in cost
and user attractiveness. Design should on one hand aim at performance maximisation but on the
other should not neglect security, making for a difficult trade-off, this is what makes the difference
in network configurations.
WMN, unlike wired networks, possesses unique characteristics that make it subject to physical
layer vulnerabilities, more specifically channel and device. However this makes it to be an low
cost alternative for expensive optic fiber or coper cables which allows for substantial cost reduc-
tions. Moreover this properties require sophisticated complex routing algorithms and protocols,
consequently increasing the necessity for message exchange and with it network overhead. Fur-
thermore is safe to say that WMN biggest vulnerabilities occur in the lower network layers such
as physical and link where cryptography is less of a tool to prevent and more to minimize impact.
Therefore malicious users can, without much work, not only do packet sniffing but also inject data
packets into the network, this allows for a great diversity of attack to be expanded in a following
subsection. Furthermore traffic control seems to be other part of the system, critical due to its
importance in maintaining the well function of the network.
As such a series of non-trivial problems are created for security design to solve and conse-
quently provide protected communication between nodes in a hostile environment as the shared
wireless medium may become.
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In the specific case at study there is an absence of infrastructure, which leads to node equality
and a distributed administration. As a result of the evenness between nodes, both rights and
obligations, security challenges arise, consequently no node can enforce security on its equal
leaving algorithms to be easily broken. (This is one of the major challenges for providing security.)
Networking challenges in WMN like in MANETs are linked with high node mobility and topology
changes.
2.1.1 Security and Vulnerabilities
Security should be one of the main concerns when planning any sort of network, and WMN are
no exception. A focal point is that security has a domino effect, where a failure or weakness can
expose the whole system, hence it is only as secure as its weakest link.
Security has three components : prevention ,detection and reaction [4]. Firstly and most impor-
tant prevention every measure should be taken to discourage and prevent users from misbehaving,
most of the times this would include some sort of cryptographic function. Secondly detection
when a single user or the whole system is misbehaving there is the need for mechanisms that will
detect it and identify the source to provide a response. Lastly the reaction where the system should
impose itself and exclude a malicious user or fix the misbehaving mechanism.
The first degree of vulnerability is in the devices, their compromise propagates throughout
the network, therefore manufacturers should hamper any possibility of tampering to protect from
functionalities takeover and information compromise. Even with tamper resistance attackers can
play on the devices limitations, the most accessible are computational and energy.
WMN, unlike wired networks, possess unique characteristics that make it subject to channel
and node vulnerabilities. Mobile ad-hoc networks have the specificity that part takers are very
mobile, they not only can enter and exit the network very frequently but also there is a high phys-
ical mobility, making the reliability of the communication not very high. Consequently a certain
tolerance has to be conceded to the devices, failures in packet delivery tend to be normal and do
not represent by itself malicious intent of the sender. As such a series of non-trivial problems arise
for security design to solve consequently guaranteeing protected communication between nodes
in a hostile environment, as the shared wireless medium may become. An illustrative example is
Figure 2.2, where a malicious user is in the network and can take advantage of every user’s packets
or even create its own.
From [5] we can interpret that vulnerabilities of the physical layer are the most outstanding,
requiring mechanisms to maintain diversity and integrity. There is an inherent fragility of the
link since nodes experience a limited level of physical protection, their compromise propagates
throughout the network, therefore manufacturers should hamper any possibility of tampering to
protect them from functionalities takeover and information compromise. Even with tamper re-
sistance attackers can play on the devices limitations, the most accessible are computational and
energy. Moreover the connectivity has a sporadic nature that makes throughput and delay levels
very inconstant. Therefore node tampering prevention is an imperative in order to maintain net-
work and communication integrity. Moreover mechanisms should be embedded on the nodes to
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Figure 2.2: WMN vulnerabilities
guarantee incorruptibility. As a result system imprinting is an important factor as minor vulnera-
bilities here may be exploited to compromise nodes.
In [5] the main vulnerabilities are in physical disruption of nodes, impersonation via protocol
based attacks, RF jamming and localization and tracking. Countermeasures are proposed, between
them we highlight authenticated link advertisement to prevent from flooding the network in one
hand and impersonation on the other. This should be done with key verification before turning
into WMN. If in a node is compromised it has a small impact in the overall network, only some
links are broken. Moreover non authenticated advertisements will not be considered. It is also
considered the use of antenna diversity to protect from location estimation and ultrawideband
transmission with very long spreading codes to prevent jamming. Also another fragility that could
be used is the backoff time [4] users give when the channel is not available, this grows with every
search and so attackers can keep the channel occupied forever.
According to [4], there are two major security issues to ensure secure routing and secure
data forwarding. Since the nodes are extremely mobile and node failure frequent, updated tables
are difficult to maintain. We can increase the update frequency but there is a trade off between
control messages and overhead. Which in this case can take a toll on battery life as well as
processing capacity forcing minimization of disclosure of keys or any other device’s non essential
information.
These are all managed and used in application level, since we want to guarantee that these
vulnerabilities are covered for the use of our application. Firstly MAC can be used both for au-
thentication and non repudiation as well as integrity. It plays an important part in maintaining
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communication trustful by not only certifying the source but also assuring that the data is uncor-
rupted. Secondly Key distribution has different weaknesses depending on the type of cryptography
we chose, symmetric or asymmetric. When working with symmetric cryptosystems the vulnera-
bility is in the secret share, as a result of the key both opening and closing the lock. There is the
need for a secret channel to exchange the key. For asymmetric the main vulnerability his linked
with trust, whether the source of the key being publicized is authentic or not. The most common
solution for this problem resorts to a central authority that can corroborate the key’s authenticity,
this can be done in various ways.
As one of the critical aspects of a security protocol,key distribution, it can be characterised in
one of two ways as to the way keys are verified and validated: centralized or decentralized.
Centralized is the most common way to share a key using a third party server or management
entity, on the other hand Decentralized key management uses devices both as server and clients
which is not only uncommon but also poorly explored and researched.
Server dependence makes it a main target for attackers, due to the
Transport layer should be authenticated and secured through encryption to prevent eavesdrop-
ping.
2.1.2 Attacks
Attacks on a network can be classified as one of two categories - Active and Passive - depending
on whether there are packet modification and node interaction, passive attacks do none of the
previous while active can do one or both. The model for attacks is presented by Eve spying on
Bob and Alice’s communication like in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Alice and Bob communicating within Eve’s reach
Passive attacks are those most difficult to detect, this is due to the remote non-interfering nature
that they have. One example of this type of attacks is Eavesdropping, Eve listens on the network
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packet exchange extracting confidential or private information from the packets. The up side is
that eavesdropping may be easily overcome or highly mitigated by the use of encryption. Traffic
analysis is another one of the attacks where Eve listen on the packet flow and analyse it, hoping
to get relevant information from the frequency and volume of communication between specific
users. Lastly tracking where rogue devices try to extract or estimate the location of users, this
can be done with messages with geolocalized data or by "line-of-sight" if the target user is within
range.
Active attacks take a more disruptive role on the network causing vaster damage on the differ-
ent layers although being easier to detect because of their interactive and unsettling nature.
Denial of Service attempts to impede the normal behaviour of a specific part of the network,
this is usually done by overloading the target with a number of messages higher than what can
be managed. As a result either a user or a set of them are impeded from communicating, in both
directions.
Channel jamming, with similar results to DoS, occurs when Eve interferes with signal emission
and reception in such a way that she blocks communication, can be achieved using the inherent
network procedures like back off, simulating congestion, or simply by overloading the users with
powerful signals that superimpose the surroundings.
Unauthorized access is related to non authenticated networks and the free access to resources
which can lead to another attack, Impersonation which consists of a malicious user impersonating
another’s identity in order to gain access to resources or private information.
Message Replay affects both lower and upper layers, this attack consists in capturing messages
and resending them in a later time, trying to replicate past circumstances or only confusing the
network and devices, usually connected with control traffic, due to the authenticity of the messages
this attack is immune to message integrity check as the messages are always authentic.
In [6], the still present Battery exhaustion attack is explored, the misbehaving user attempts
to rapidly drain the battery of the aimed battery device. Wormhole is a specific attack to ad hoc
network where a node does not forward the messages creating a “hole” in the network.
All the previous active attacks can be generalized into Man In The Middle which refers to a
strategically placed attacker that is within the network with capability of listening to messages and
altering message content. Such an attack aims at the manipulation of communication in a way that
it favors the objectives rogue node, which can range from selfish interests in content to the arm of
a specific user.
(This is a summary of generic attacks. It should be focused on attacks on wireless ad-hoc
networks, describing which attacks are most likely in those networks and why. )
2.2 Security and Cryptography
While no big problems or economical loss arise from security failures or vulnerabilities, re-
searchers and companies will not be motivated towards it, mostly due to the amount of work
and expenses that it results in. Hence as a rule, security is always the last concern, WMN is no
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exception. In order to tie lose ends and assure communication runs properly the help of cryptog-
raphy is used. More commonly known as encryption, cryptography is both a science and an art
that brings together secrecy and security. Moreover, to protect messages from third parties, it in-
curs in a transformation of messages into unintelligible information through a reversible process.
Nowadays intimately connected with mathematics and statistics, cryptography has been evolving
in a fashion that promotes efficiency and effectiveness without loosing its efficacy in protecting
information, assuring confidentiality and integrity, and users,guaranteeing not only authentication
but also non repudiation and access control.
According to [1] there are two types of cryptography relevant in networking infrastructures,
Symmetric and Asymmetric. These two are distinguishable by the amount of keys necessary in
each secret, encrypted message, which is respectively one and two. What would apparently look
like a simple fact results in very different properties as well as uses for each one of the cryptog-
raphy types. Detailed description is out of the scope but an overview on main characteristics and
properties is relevant.
2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography
We will start on symmetric cryptography which is regarded as the classical cryptography, has
been keeping secrets for thousands of years through the most diverse algorithms. Not only do
symmetric cryptosystems have the advantage of simplicity and efficiency but also the algorithms
are much simpler to implement and less demanding both on encryption and decryption in terms
of the amounts of time and processing required. Even though authentication cannot be verified
by using symmetric algorithms which creates the need for auxiliary mechanisms. In this type of
cryptography users use encryption like in a common locker like we see in Figure 2.5 where they
put the package in and use the same key to close(encrypt) and open(decrypt). The basic procedure
works like this:
Figure 2.4: Symmetric Cryptography
• M : message to be enciphered
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• K : a secret key
• E : enciphering function
• D : deciphering function
• C : enciphered message. C = E(M, K)
For all M, C, and K, M = D(C,K) = D(E(M,K),K)
The most widely used algorithms in Symmetric key cryptology is Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard, Data Encryption Standard and triple DES.
The great disadvantage of the symmetric model is the key distribution. Since the key is com-
mon to both parties it must be shared between the communication ends while being kept a secret
from all the others. This is the challenge that will be taken up and a solution for our specific case
will be developed.
2.2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Requiring more processing as well as implementation effort we find asymmetric cryptography
also known as public key cryptography. Public Key Cryptography is the most common due to
its properties allowing for many and complex security mechanisms and architectures. The basis
of this cryptography is, as can be seen in Figure 2.5, a key pair where they are relational yet
independent of each other.
From the both names we can deduce the use of the public key and infer existence of a different,
asymmetric, key which is the private key, each of the key pair decrypt the other and are assigned
to a specific user. The strength of this model is that one key of the pair need not be known by
anyone but its owner, which allows for it to be kept a secret, while widely spreading the public
key. This keys decrypt each other but cannot be obtained from each other even if the user processes
a message, encrypted or decrypted. Due to the possibility of encrypting with both keys the choice
is based on the desired destination and effect.
Figure 2.5: Asymmetric Cryptography
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The key pair is generated through the factorization of great prime numbers which makes the
keys related mathematically while keeping them unobtainable from each other.
The most widely used asymmetric-key cryptosystem is RSA but ElGamal and Elliptic curve
are also relevant. RSA works with big prime integers which makes them highly complex, requiring
a large amount of computation resources, and hence making it difficult to break for devices.
The basic mechanisms that are used in complex asymmetric cryptography implementations
are message authentication, message encryption and also message integrity, when aided by hash
function or message authentication code. Asymmetric cryptography has the most basic building
block, message encryption, it takes the following procedures.
• M : message to be enciphered
• Pubkey : public secret key
• Prikey : private secret key
• E : enciphering function
• D : deciphering function
• C : enciphered message. C = E(M, Pubkey) or C= E(M, Prikey)
• Messages are obtained by deciphering enciphered ones. Notice that only the complementary
of the key used in enciphering can decipher the message.
M = D(C,Pubkey) = D(E(M, Prikey),Pubkey)
M = D(C,Prikey) = D(E(M, Pubkey),Prikey)
When using asymmetric cryptography and wanting to send an encrypted message one should
encrypt it with the destinations public key then only it will have the private key necessary for de-
cryption, hence being the only one able to obtain and read intelligible information. If the objective
is to authenticate the message one should encipher it before sending with its own private key to be
deciphered by anyone with the widely known public key.
While asymmetric cryptography empowers devices and applications with higher level of secu-
rity both in key distribution and also by verifying authenticity. Furthermore it has an infrastructure
and tool necessary for session establishment. It is also very resource and time expensive requiring
some effort to resolve the factorization of the great prime numbers.
Its this last fact that discourages and diverts us from asymmetric cryptography as less demand-
ing proceedings needed.
2.2.3 Hash Functions
Hash functions are a very useful and light tool used throughout security algorithms and are used
in not only the verification of data integrity but also random number generation.
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A hash function maps a variable length string into a fixed length one. In most cases a hash is
a succession of compression functions, sometimes done in an iterative way. This sort of function
is characterised for being extremely fast and light and also for its pseudo randomness.
In [1] we can find a definition for cryptographic hash function where it needs to have the one-
way property and the collision-free property in order to be held as a reliable function. In common
terms this translates into the facts that it is virtually impossible to both obtain from a hash the
data from which it was mapped and also to obtain the same hash for a different set of data, for
really good hash this is even true when you know the originating and resulting string. Feature that
prove essential when verifying message integrity and digital signature two of the most important
applications for this tool, pseudo random number generation and function are other important
ones.
The most common standard hash functions are SHA, in versions 1 and 2, and MD5. The
predominant choice is SHA1 due to its security characteristics on resistance to preimage and
collision.
2.2.4 Centralized Models
(You should start with a short description of what a centralised security model is.) Centralized
models rely on a central trustworthy point that distributes or verifies keys and administers the
network. The central authority or server keeps records on all the partakers behaviour. On one
hand these models have the advantage of making user’s work lighter while on the other hand there
is a high server dependency. Which translates into a one point vulnerability where a DoS or other
server compromising attack can shut the network down or even compromise all user data. Central
authorities take the form of routers or server with the capacity to provide the users with services
while at the same time administer the network by detecting flaws and reacting to them.
Public Key Infrastructure is the use of asymmetric cryptography and is the most common
method for centralized security models, not only for the functionalities of encryption and authen-
tication, but also for the ease public keys can be shared. This is also the main challenge as their
authenticity as to be verified by other entity in order to ascertain its origin.
The standard X.509 allows for the creation of certificate with stipulated parameters ensur-
ing the authenticity of a public key. The specifications can be found on the standard [7]. In this
standard is also specified revocation certificates that disable the acknowledge of public key au-
thenticity, in other words banns the user from lists of verified users to a black list. The principle
behind certificates is the existence of a higher authority that verifies the correspondence of a public
key and the corresponding user or device, this takes the form of a signature that assures other of
the authenticating. The certificate formalises this connection with the authority’s signature, which
can be verified by all users. This has proven very useful in widely distributed systems such as the
world wide web environment. The certificate plays one of the biggest roles in security models as
it is the most extensively used way to verify keys authenticity. What differs between models is the
way the certificate is validated, fetched or even the amounts of certificates per user. The certificate
plays the role of a passport where users want to engage in a connection they verify others passport
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by asking them the number, public key, followed by validating it with a higher trusted authority.
This procedures not only ascertains the authenticity of the certificate but also verifies that it is a
trusted user.
2.2.4.1 Public Key Infrastructure
Also known as PKI this is the most widely used security scheme, it shifts the complexity towards
the server or service provider making users experience more friendly, fluid and upgradable. The
main pieces are the previously described certificates and asymmetric cryptography. Every con-
nection starts with authentication towards the central server of both ends either each one retrieves
a certificate from the authority and forward it to the other communication end or both ask for the
destinations certificate. In both cases the users end up using the public and private keys of the
destination’s and their own, respectively. After the authentication process, in which the infrastruc-
ture crucial and indispensable part, users agree on a symmetric key to light the encryption and
decryption operation both in complexity and time while maintaining or even increasing the key
size. Most widely implemented and used standards are the secure socket layer, transport layer
security, simple authentication and security layer, between many others. This standards allowed
for the growth and securing of the internet as well as many network applications. If not for this
it would not be possible to benefit from many of the services internet provides the most clear are
banking and shopping where users fear the most for their data.
2.2.4.2 Kerberos
Kerberos is a centralized authentication service that enables a central authority with a transparent,
efficient and scalable verification. Moreover it provides access to resources within a network with
one use only tickets based algorithm as can be found on [1]. The transparency of this service is
guaranteed by the mandatory authentication of both the user and the server on each access request,
ticket issuance. For instance, if a user wants to access a printer it must first get a printer ticket.
In this process both the user and the server authenticate themselves. Through this access granting
scheme users rely on a central service to grant them tickets, the simplicity yet effective model of
the authentication makes this a very efficient model for security.
2.2.4.3 MobiSec
A particular case for centralized security scheme in WMN is MobiSec [8]. Although oriented
towards network management This model uses the capabilities of routers to distribute key while
maintaining independence from technology used in the communication, making security transpar-
ent from the user point of view. Besides user independence MobiSec is able to maintain negligible
impact on network performance without sacrificing security. Furthermore this model is intended
to extend network in a wireless inexpensive way. The security for users is done in two levels,
as we can see in Figure 2.6, separating clients, which only have access to services, and servers,
who proliferate the coverage throughout the environment. It is important to say that it is assumed
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that operators will provide a secure authentication server that will distribute keys and authenticate
users. In order to gain access as a client you need to possess a certificate with your credentials
that will be validated by the authentication server, only then will it be retrieved a seed to create
keys and the seed’s time to live. When a user already has client access it can engage in a server
validation for which it needs to have another valid certificate, this time with server credentials,
to be verified by the authentication server which will lead to a session set up. Consequently the
server will be provided with the key list and its time to live, being therefore able to validate clients
and forward their messages. Note that all the certificates are signed by a trusted authority, and
they are the tool that prevent man in the middle attacks. Not only that but the fact that keys only
provide interaction downstream and not to the authentication server, together with having time to
live makes only certified authorities the only ones able to obtain them. this is an important feature
that not only prevents impersonation but also makes the improbable compromise of a list of keys
have a minor impact.
Figure 2.6: MobiSec architecture
MobiSec was simulated and tested with very positive network results both in performance and
security, making it computational infeasible to crack their packets.
2.2.5 Decentralized Models
There is not much work done in security decentralized models where the main drawback is the
absence of a authentication/certification authority able to provide an immune credible judgement
on device credibility, as stated in [9] and [10], but also certificate revocation or black list insertion.
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2.2.5.1 Pretty Good Privacy
We will introduce, Pretty Good Privacy, a free ware security mechanism widely utilized in email
and file storage applications.
The combination of the algorithms and Cryptographic functions makes it one of the top choices
due to the security resistance of its elements, ease of use and wide dissemination. PGP is a de-
centralized system users have several Private/Public key pair used to in distributed public key trust
lists. The secure information are traded with session key, only used once for a single email, this
key follows encrypted with the destination’s public key. This technology also allows for message
integrity check and message authentication. For each Public key entry a PGP computed key legit-
imacy field is assigned to it that evaluates the level of binding between the ID and the Public Key.
Also an signature trusted field and a owner trust field are linked to the user, the first goes to the
credibility of the user in signing public keys and the second shows how trustworthy is this user to
certify others.
Public key revocation is usually done by the key owner, when a key is compromised. Users is-
sue a revocation certificate signed with the corresponding Private key. PGP introduces the concept
of web of trust where every user keeps a ring of public keys.
Self organization is one decentralized alternative proposed in [9], where all nodes play equiva-
lent roles and is fully decentralized. It is regarded as an adaptation of the well known PGP (Pretty
Good Privacy), as the nodes can emit their own certificates and therefore self organize. Like in
PGP publicly divulged and distributed trust list where every node includes its own set of trusted
keys. And also like in PGP there is used a greatly balanced set of cryptographic functions that
allow for a maximization of security while maintaining the efficiency and effectiveness of the
network. This protocol has all the characteristics to be a good solution for the decentralized key
sharing problem.
2.2.5.2 Key Agreement
Key agreement is a proposal from N. Asokan and P. Ginzboorg in [11], for a distributed network
system within a limited physical space or with another secure means to share simple key other
than the WMN itself. This definition is very close to the system we want and so it is of particular
interest.
Instead of the usual centralized mechanisms allowing for the sharing of a strong secure key,
Key Agreement is based on the fact that a prior context share is available and therefore a authen-
ticated key exchange is feasible. By using an authenticated exchange users are able to create a
temporarily secure and an authenticated user/group channel. The great advantage of this model is
to build a strong cryptography from a weak password share consequently improving it greatly and
significantly the level of security.
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2.2.5.3 Threshold Cryptography
Explored in many models due to its properties threshold cryptography is applied in decentralized
models so that a group judges the integrity of nodes. The central authority absence calls for a
group judgement, in other words, since all the users or devices are regarded as equals a minimum
of users must agree in a decision. The principle behind it is that only a certain percentage of users
are malicious or misbehaving so a meaningful part of the users need to subscribe to the acceptance,
this way the probability of being a misbehaving user is decreased significantly. The problem of
this model is the chain of certificates that grows substantially on every acceptance. For instance
a user that gets validated by five has to then use five certificates to validate communication with
others.
In [12], threshold cryptography is explored without certificates in a distributed fashion and it is
proved that as long as the malicious users are under a certain threshold the network and its users are
secure. As a way to circumvent certificates an algorithm that resembles a ID based cryptography is
used, linking node ID to public key, and alternative mechanisms contemplate the use of Feldman’s
Verifiable Secret Sharing which allows users to check the validity of the keys. through the use of
both this tools users can engage in pairwise authentication and encrypted communication. VSS
is used to share the keys, in several secrets that are derived in a polynomial interpolation from a
large prime, it is then verified from witnesses, other users secrets through Lagrange’s interpolation
formula.
This allows for multiple verifications of the users authenticity which not only simplifies the
authentication with a single certificate verification but there are performance advantages as it de-
creases user and implementation effort. This author claims the scheme to be more efficient than
IBC for a reasonably sized group with a low threshold of malicious users.
2.2.5.4 ONE
ONE [13] although oriented towards lower layers like routing and physical, introduces interest-
ing concepts to the WMN. Both evolution through generations and also fitness are successfully
implemented with promising results. For instance when a device joins the network it will only
authenticate with certain amount of other devices, this proves an effective solution for sectorizing
the network authentication while maintaining immediate connectivity and continuously maximiz-
ing performance. Evolution allows for nodes to deal with increasing complexity and neighbours
that allows for a steadier more secure and robust growth of the network by maximising resources
and performance. The fitness of a generation is what allows the network to choose whether to
evolve or to retrocede. Moreover fitness is constituted by weighed set of measurement that in-
fluence network performance such as power, coverage, path loss, confidentiality and cost. This
gene-like evolution concept presents interesting perspectives in terms of dealing with scalability
since it prevents devices from overloading while promoting optimization.
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2.2.5.5 DSA-Mesh
Another fully decentralized solution that is presented as a evolution of MobiSec by the same
authors, simulated in large network scenarios as can be seen in [14].
It is implemented using similar structure to the centralized model with two level authentica-
tion. The first stage makes use of the threshold cryptography to authenticate and consequently
accept the new user attributing the temporary key that will allow him to engage in communication
within the network. This key will not only attest to his credentials but will also be used to encrypt
communication. On a second step if authorized a node can try to authenticate to the key manage-
ment service and become a core node. Hence the distinction between normal and core nodes is in
the permissions and tasks in the network.
This security scheme accepts that devices in the network have key pairs as well as a binding
certificate signed by well known trusted authority imprinted in them before and therefore can be
verified by the closest network node. Also it is assumed that part of backbone core nodes are
tamper resistance and synchronization is needed. Lastly key lists are assigned a time session for
their validity, during which other keys derivation is valid.
The Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm, that allows for the retrieving of a secret using only
part of its shares, together with the threshold signature scheme, which enables a set of nodes to
verify a key without revealing their private one, are used in the key distribution and session secret
agreement. Key distribution is based on a proactive request protocol where users renew their own
set of key in order to keep them updated and therefore each user requests the several necessary
secret parts to the core node that retrieve them in an encrypted, authenticated and timestamped
manner so that the requesting user can then combine the retrieved parts and therefore obtain the
session secret. The session secret is initiated by one of the core nodes that generates a large prime
and shares with the other key agreement members. This is done in a three message process that
encloses the secret in different mathematical operations that are easily reversible by the corre-
spondents but computational infeasible for attackers. The generator here in the form of a user can
change rotatively or by other mechanism.
This scheme not only excels because of the independence from underlying technologies but
also the seamless mobility of routers as well elimination of single point failure.
2.2.5.6 AP3
Lastly a more recent model that provides decentralized anonymous communication is AP3 [15],
that provides users with anonymity even if part of the network is constituted by malicious coop-
erating users. In the proposed protocol every node is assigned a nodeId and a key which is then
used for routing purposes. The central mechanism of this scheme is a coin toss with weighted
probability between sending the packet to the destination or forwarding it to another user, this
should be greater than 50% in order for the packet to reach its destination but lower than one to
maintain the uncertainty. Provided that the origin is kept anonymous and uncertain, the possibility
of weighed coin toss, in every hop. At every point of the packet course the user does not know
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if the previous user sent it or is just forwarding it. Furthermore by keeping packet delivery to
destination uncertain in every hop users have probable innocence.
The downside is that no origin is provided and so there is no way to reply. To circumvent
this problem there needs to be a channel created between the communication users. Channels
are attributed an ID followed by the put off a message for channel creation sent, like a regular
one, through several hops that will agree to forward messages with that channel ID from the next
destination to the previous origin and vice versa. Necessity for frequent refreshment is obvious
since the channel may be disrupted or compromised.
The creation of secure pseudonyms is covered by this proposal allowing user to create their
own key pair and distribute public keys. Since no validation or certification is necessary not only
user flooding is possible by the creation of bogus users but also compromised key pairs can lead
to impersonation.
Lastly group communication is also covered either in publishing and subscription. This is done
by the creation of a tree, publisher sends an anonymous message to the a root that then forwards it
again through anonymous messages. Every node of the process can claim that it is just forwarding
the message, possible innocence.
2.2.6 Comparative Analysis
First of all it is important to highlight the fact that anonymity has the drawback of impunity, since
no identity can be excluded from the network misbehaving users can comeback anytime, therefore
it is important to insert some sort of traceability when dealing with malicious users consequently
providing some closure to the regular ones while blaming and excluding responsible parties.
Comparing centralized and decentralized models is not a linear analysis because there are sev-
eral strengths and weaknesses to take into account, one must not make premature judgements. The
design of different solutions tries to work the details in a way that certain aspects of the connectiv-
ity get maximised but there is always some drawbacks that are created in the process. Concerning
centralised models in general users take the most advantage enjoying the most effortless, care-
free fluid experience, but also providers the added benefits of easier correction of vulnerabilities
and upgrade of the infrastructure. On the other hand they suffer from single point failure making
central points very fragile, expensive elements that must account for most of the network’s effort.
Like stated before PKI needs an absolute tamper proof repository to sign certificates as keys are
verified, a very hard task to accomplish in addition to the lasting description using asymmetric
encryption. Kerberos is an efficient solution only justifiable for large scale systems, not suitable
for small scale. On the specific case of MobiSec it is possible to deduct two important conclusions
one the need for keys time-outs and also separate the validation components from the session ones.
Decentralised have some inertia in regard to upgrades, with a high dependence on users proac-
tivity and are less reactive systems in this aspect. For example a application built on a decentral-
ized model while very independent and redundant will need every user to upgrade or it cannot
implement new features, it also has to keep backward compatibility. Although AP3 provides very
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interesting analysis into anonymity and how to provide it to users, it has tremendous liability
issues. Users may do as they please and there will be no consequences.
PGP has clear limitation due to their self certifying users but it show the advantage of using
contact and publicly shared information to engage users in secure communication.
key agreement is limited in the sense that it needs a secure channel or shared location in order
to provide the necessary security but it does prove an important point in the sense that the creation
of new keys and their renewal makes the communication exponentially more secure.
ONE introduces an exceptionally enriching concept, generations, a real solution for simplify-
ing big dimension networks with a huge amount of devices can be broken down into steps where
only a certain amount of authentications is done by the device with the aim to maximize network
resources and performance. The downside is that it takes some extra effort and the sharing of
device parameters which can be viewed as a vulnerability.
DSA-Mesh like the MobiSec pushes for a two level authentication which is proven to have
good performance. It is most useful in networks with infrastructure for further dissemination as it
requires large implementation effort due to its complex secret sharing that has some probability of
failure in case part of the network becomes unavailable for some reason.
AP3 presents a good anonymizing solution for mesh but it gives no traceability and therefore
no responsibility to users, this can prove useful for dissidents but unreliable for normal transgres-
sions and adulterations of the service.
2.3 Serverless XMPP
The instant messaging and presence protocol widely known as XMPP or Jabber constitutes a
solution for near real-time communication using extensible markup language XML streams and
presence notifications. Its core structure is specified in IETF 6120.
XMPP was created in 1998 by Jeremie Miller, since then there are numerous implementations
of the XMPP standard for clients, servers and libraries, as can be found in [16]. The internet engi-
neering task force normalized XMPP as the internet standard for instant messaging and presence.
Since this standard is open source and has been distanced from jabber, anyone is free to use it
without any fees or royalties.
Due to its versatility and the constant custom functionalities being built on top of XMPP, the
XMPP Standards Foundation was created not only to manage common extensions but also to
maintain interoperability. Moreover XMPP ended up being used in various applications beyond
instant messaging including groupchat, network management, collaboration tools, file sharing,
gaming, remote systems control and monitoring, geolocation, middleware and cloud computing,
VoIP and Identity services. The most well known applications are google’s chatting functionalities
talk and google+.
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2.3.1 Architecture
As a result of the simple architecture in some ways similar to email, every device can easily
become an independent server and client. Furthermore the XMPP does not have the need for a
central authority, every user has its own ID both of this characteristics create security liabilities. As
a result of the device independence it is possible to implement XMPP as a decentralized solution
an essential feature in the development of our work.
The architecture of XMPP resembles, as referred before, the email one, it is globally address-
able and clients and servers are aware of presence. This leads to challenges in addressing as every
user needs a unique address but this requires absolute knowledge about possible collisions. Ad-
dresses, here regarded as JID, are created with some of the device’s information like the resource,
domain and resource, which on the one hand improves routing and on another assures uniqueness
usually take the form "localpart @ domainpart / resourcepart" . According to /citeRFC6122 The
domainpart is a fully qualified domain name, IPv4 address, IPv6 address, or unqualified host-
name. while the localpart entity requesting and using network access provided by a server or other
kind of entity and is held in the context of a specific domain. Finally resourcepart is an optional
component that identifies a specific connection or object belonging to the entity associated with a
localpart at a domain.
XMPP stanzas are the elementary unit for communication. They constitute XML fragments
sent over streams and can be divided into three kinds: message, presence, and IQ (short for
"Info/Query"). Stanzas include addressing elements, "to" and "from", complemented by payload
elements to send data.
The presence notifications reveal to other user availability are advertised in a similar fashion
to multicast dns, although done with a stanza. This functionality may not be essential for server
based XMPP it is essential in a serverless version,otherwise there is no destination for the mes-
sages. While only improving real-time performance for centralized implementations, its crucial in
serverless messaging because only after presence is addressing info exchanged.
After joining the network every node is attributed a persistent stream over a long lived TCP
connection. this allows for data to be pushed with constant availability making routing and delivery
immediate.
XMPP is usually used over TCP but it can also be implemented over http or udp. In TCP,
domain name server constitutes an addressing solution for services, it maps a user and a service
into an ip address and a port essential to any sort of communication. The PTR constitutes a sort of
presence signal, being necessary to retrieve preferably the PTR record and having A as a fallback.
For serverless xmpp this process tends to be quiet simple since every device is a server.
2.3.2 Serverless Messaging
It is never enough to stress that security comes at the cost of performance and therefore this over-
head is going to increase delay, complexity. In brief makes the global network less efficient but
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there is a silverlining and the challenge is that users or measurements are not affected, the same
result has to be delivered within a reasonable margin.
Serverless messaging is the choice when applications are intended to communicate over local
or wide-area networks using the principles of zero-configuration networking. The method used for
service discovery is in every way similar to normal XMPP but its closer to DNS and multicast DNS
is used to find protocol supporters as well as their ip addresses and preferred ports. Specification
can be found in [17] sanctioned by the XSF
DNS simplifies the relation between users by retrieving for every service the corresponding
data. Furthermore dns has three types of records that have different information in them. The
A record specifies a device in host at an ip. The SRV exposes a user in device with service at
a port and device in host. Furthermore the PTR has the service linked with user at a certain
device with a service available to communicate over a determined protocol. Lastly there is a TXT
record where extended information about the user is divulged, it can be used in more complex chat
implementations or just to save specific implementation fields. They are posted in the network
by the here presented order even though users requisite in reverse when devices are looking for
services and only after discovery they require extra information.
Opposing to regular XMPP streams are only created after the service discovery, which is done
by looking for "_presence._tcp.local." in PTR. This will mean possible supporters of the serverless
messaging, which if true will reply leading to the initialization of a stream.
A stream is initiated by a user to which a stream header is expected in response, after that that
stream features are exchanged.
After the agreement on stream configuration normal XMPP stanzas can be exchanged with
payload.
2.4 Resume and Discussion
In the scenario at study no infrastructure is available so centralized models were studied for their
strengths as well as comparative solution and in a way for inspirational purposes. Server depen-
dency is one of the drawbacks of centralized models, making it the biggest target for attacks.
From the Security analyses done we could see that a decentralized model may take some more
implementation and user effort, but it grants security redundancies that prove important in the
proposed scenario. From the distributed models it was extracted highly relevant insights as to how
to improve security in a decentralized manner by studying and comparing different approaches to
similar problems. In the end we will exploit the strengths from our favourite schemes and combine
them into a design of our own.
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Chapter 3
Security Scheme
3.1 Introduction
The security scheme designed intends to provide both anonymity in discovery and privacy in
communication, enabling users secure communications with known acquaintances. This is done
in a decentralized, device independent, manner so that central server dependence is forgone and
free secure interactions are reassured and incited.
This security scheme, inspired by the message exchange applications using data packets most
widely used in mobile devices, will also use the phone number as an identifier. It is used mostly
due to two factors, firstly the phone number is an unique identifier second if one wants to contact
someone through a phone one most certainly will have their number. Moreover, everyone has a
considerable amount of phone numbers in their phone’s address list, this will include the majority
of the people they want to talk to and provides also a way to exclude those who do not want to
contact.
This scheme intends to improve efficiency and security through a balanced tradeoff for every
mobile user and consequently his device. With these goals only nodes that may constitute known
acquaintances should be processed while guaranteeing, at the same time, disclosure of the identity
solely to known contacts. Efficiency and security are further enforced through a series of proce-
dures undertaken by mobile nodes in order to establish a session. Only after session establishment
will identities be discovered and private communication assured to both.
While the session is not established, all message exchange is undertaken using an alias so
anonymity is preserved.
All of the above is achieved using a specifically designed authentication process based on key
derivation where the phone number plays a central role. The procedures undertaken for session
establishment use encrypted information during the handshake, therefore are protected from more
curious users. The authentication process designed aims for secure identification between known
acquaintances, like in any internet secure protocol used for key agreement and identity verification.
Once that an user is known, authenticated and a session is established, users can exchange
messages more securely.
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3.2 Attacks and Vulnerabilities
During the analysis done in the previous Chapter 2, we identified the vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by a malicious user, therefore the designed scheme intends to prevent the following
attacks towards the mesh network:
• Impersonation - malicious user impersonating another’s identity
• Unauthorized Access - non authenticated user gaining access to restricted resources
• Eavesdropping - attacker listens on the network packet exchange, extracting confidential
or private information
• Man in the Middle - strategically placed attacker within the network with capability of
listening to messages and altering their content
– Alteration - attacker captures messages and resends them with modified content
– Forgery - attacker inserts fictitious messages as if authenticated by another user
– Replay - attacker captures messages and resends them in a later time
The designed solution to prevent this sort of threat will resort to some cryptographic tools,
more specifically:
1. Anonymity - makes devices and users very hard to link and trace preventing user targeting
for attacks like DoS or Jamming
2. Encryption - protects message content and information in general, transforming it seem-
ingly into random bits
3. Authentication - verification of user identity preventing impersonation and unauthorised
access
4. Message integrity check - Validates message integrity and origin, averting repudiation as
well as alteration making
5. Time Stamp - not a cryptographic tool intrinsically but is applied forfending replay attacks
Combined this tools will prevent most of the users vulnerabilities, putting any concern about
the ones mentioned above to rest. Consequently encouraging the use of the service.
3.3 Solution Design
3.3.1 Anonymity
Anonymity need arises from the necessity to separate users and addresses in service discovery. As
a result, targeting users becomes harder if not impossible, if IP addresses are renewed by random
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generation with every network use, hence not predictable by attackers. As a solution, the use of
a pseudonym is proposed that, on one hand, does not reveal the user’s identity and, on the other,
gives a clue that will allow acquaintances to derive its identity. It is the tradeoff between these two
that creates the challenge of balancing the surrender of information towards the attacker and user
experience.
To create the pseudonym each user will use a fake ID or a non revealing one, an imperative in
order to obtain the so desired anonymity. This name, or identifier, will be used to undertake the
message exchange prior to session establishment not only towards the desired users, with whom
we will engage in sessions, but also for undesired and vicious ones, whom we do not wish to
engage with or even want to avoid.
Between the infinite possibilities of pseudonyms at our disposal we chose a very well known
one - John Doe.
The idea comes from the place holder name used to represent someone when their identity is
unknown or must be withheld for legal reasons. For example if a patient arrives unconscious to
the hospital without Identification, he will be regarded as a John Doe until his identity is resolved.
Another use given to this pseudonym is the stakeholder in trials, it is used by someone who needs
to be tried anonymously. The nature of the chat service is multicast DNS as it uses the standardized
Serverless XMPP, therefore a DNS record is needed for each user. In a DNS record a username is
needed to identify the user of the device and service correspondent to the IP and MAC addresses.
Due to the necessity of differentiation and in order to make usernames linkable to specific contacts
we attach a portion of the phone number.
Portuguese phone numbers, the ones used as reference in this work, are made of a series of 9
digits. In Table 3.1 the possibilities of information surrender in pseudonym are explored. Firstly,
N is shown in a different letter as it can only take four different values, the ones existent in Por-
tuguese mobile network indicators [1,2,3,6] as found in the plan for national numbers regulated
by ANACOM [18]. We use the unit of information as bit obtained from the log2, this is a more
explicit method to then calculate the computational cost inherent to the code break. Percentages
are presented to provide a better notion of the dimension of the tradeoff. The analysis is detailed
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Information Analysis
Digits Termination
Combinations
Number
Combinations
Information
(bits)
Information
surrendered
(bits)
Information
surrendered
(percentage)
9N YYYYYYY 0 x 40000000 25,25 x x
9N YYYYYY X 1 10 4000000 21,93 3,32 13,149%
9N YYYYY XX 2 100 400000 18,61 6,64 26,297%
9N YYYY XXX 3 1 000 40000 15,29 9,96 39,446%
9N YYY XXXX 4 10 000 4000 11,97 13,28 52,594%
To complete the comparison from the user perspective, a collision analysis was made in order
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to estimate the gain for the user. This way we can deduct if the impact on the processing time of
the handshake, since an iteration is processed for every matching contact. Through this collision
analysis we explore for the set of "d" possible combinations, given by the amount of surrendered
digits, and a contact list of size "n", the probability of having to do more than one iteration.
The collision probability is derived by the generalization of the birthday paradox where the
probability is given by the complement probability of the event: getting at least one pair. Accepting
the assumption that every event is independent.
p(n,d) =
{
1−∏n−1k=1(1− kd ) n≤ d
1 n> d.
(3.1)
For n≤ d we have:
p(n,d) = 1−
(
(1− n−1
d
)(1− n−2
d
)(1− n−3
d
) · · ·(1− 1
d
)
)
. (3.2)
Using the approximation e−x ≈ 1− x equates to:
p(n,d) = 1−
(
(1− e− 1d )(1− e− 2d )(1− e− 3d ) · · ·(1− e− n−1d )
)
(3.3)
Where 1+2+3 · · ·(r−1) = r r−12 resolving into:
p(n,d) = 1−
(
1− e−n· n−12·d
)
(3.4)
Using Equation 3.4 the graphics were plotted using for n and d the values of the Table 3.1
except for the 1 digit where is clear that a collision will occur for more than 10 contacts. The
values for d 100 , 1000 and 10000 are plotted in Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
From the Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 we conclude that for an average sized contact list, 150 num-
bers, contact list the probability will be over 50% that a more than one iteration will be executed.
More specifically, in Figure 3.1, it is observed that just after 20 there is more than 80% probability
of collision and for n> 30; p(n,100)> 0.99, which leads to the conclusion that al least one colli-
sion will occur with every user. In Figure 3.2 we find that n> 100; p(n,1000)> 0.99 and just for
50-60 contact the probability is higher than 50%. Lastly for 4 digits depicted in Figure 3.3 we find
that if n> 150; p(n,10000)> 0.50 also for n> 300; p(n,100)> 0.99.
To sum up, only 4 digits really prevent collision for a reasonably sized address book, also
the surrendering of more 26%, or even just 13%, of the information does not justify the gains
presented in the collision, that are very thin for the normal user, not assuring that another iteration
is not going be made. For all stated and analysed previously, the choice fell onto the two digit
option that provide the user with the most security while, at the same time, not greatly arming the
performance when compared with the alternatives.
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Figure 3.1: Collision probability for 2 digits
3.3.1.1 Brute force
A brute force attack is one of the ways to measure security and a very important one. It constitutes
an action where the attacker attempts to break security by trying every possibility. The average
amount of tries needed to break the code is half of the total possibilities. Furthermore this provides
an important information when designing the algorithm. For the analysed values it was estimated a
modest operating time and so it is shown on Table 3.2 the values in hours for a range of operating
times is seconds over the amount of bits surrendered in the pseudonym.
These operating times are presented within a 0.16 second and two seconds due to the limited
computational power of mobile devices but this are only an estimate to be confirmed in practical
implementation. The times used in Table 3.2, where derived from experimental procedures where
it was determined an baseline time for the operation using the devices available. This time was
estimated taken into account the message exchange times obtained with the wireshark, explained
in more detail in Chapter 5. As the wireshark is a very imprecise measuring tool this value illustrate
the order of magnitude more than a precise measuring. This table intends to provide the reader
with an estimation of the attack time. This time values illustrate both what an attacker with a
similar device will face and what attackers can achieve with mobile devices with supplementary
computing power.
The values presented here can be considered positive, regarding that even for a short operation
time like a 0.16 second the attacker needs between 10 hours, when four digits are used, and one
year ,for the one digit. A great deal of security can be gained by increasing the time of operation
in every iteration, in our algorithm it is done by increasing the number of iteration in the key
expansion.
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Figure 3.2: Collision probability for 3 digits
3.3.1.2 Number Vulnerability
The phone number, due to the central role it takes in the scheme, becomes a vulnerability. As such
implementation should take an extra effort so as to verify its integrity and assure the proposed
mechanism is tamper proof.
The following hypothesis make for a more certain verification:
• Device Number validation
user interface
device access to SIM card or network data
• previous to ad hoc mode validation
• Remote validation
text messages
Table 3.2: Brute force time
Digits Number
Combinations
2s (hours) 1s (hours) 0.5s (hours) 0.25s (hours) 0.16s (hours)
1 4000000 111111 55555,6 27777,8 13888,9 8888,9
2 400000 11111 5555,6 2777,8 1388,9 888,9
3 40000 1111 555,6 277,8 138,9 88,9
4 4000 111 55,6 27,8 13,9 8,9
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Figure 3.3: Collision probability for 4 digits
server upon app installation
inter user authentication
phone call
remote from server in app installation
inter user authentication
It is important to acknowledge the fact that number tampering or impersonation can be accom-
plished by attackers if number verification is not implemented. It is also indispensable to highlight
that this design is intended for localized ad-hoc networks greatly decreasing the possibility of im-
personation going unnoticed adding to the fact that other channels can be used to revalidate the
integrity of the user identity. To prevent this sort of issue it is advisable to use a combination of
the previously exposed hypothesis.
3.3.2 Privacy
Through this requirement we want to limit the access users have to information. It is intended
that only the desired users can obtain intelligible information. In practice this means that an
eavesdropper that comes into the network will not be able to interpret the exchanged information
even if capable of obtaining the data packets flowing throughout the network.
Privacy requirements are motivated by the necessity to withhold relevant, delicate or private
information from unwanted users. Wireless networks have tremendous liability issues in privacy,
due to the fact that every user can access the flow of packets mostly because the communication
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medium is of public and unrestricted nature. Therefore, privacy protection is of great relevance
and so mechanisms have to be developed to protect users from the network weaknesses.
The most obvious action to tackle this issue is encryption, leaving a less immediate question:
symmetric or asymmetric? The critical difference between the two is the computational and time
effort needed to process each one of them. The authentication is also a crucial point, it is only
implemented in asymmetric encryption functions. For symmetric cryptography it requires auxil-
iary mechanisms. What makes the effort so particularly important is the context where this issue
is addressed, a network composed by mobile devices. As a result the AES encryption will be used
due to its balanced trade off between key size and performance. The minimum key size of 128 bit
was chosen in order to minimize user experience impact.
The key size is obtained through an expansion of the phone number, from the approximate 25
bit where 6bit are public to 128 bit, allowing to generate from a 9 digit "password" 128 bit security
key.
3.3.3 Encryption
In the analysis of the encryption scheme to use the opted solution excluded asymmetric cryptogra-
phy due to its large computational effort, inadequate for mobile devices for its extreme complexity
in implementation and design for distributed schemes. Besides, not only is this type of cryptogra-
phy highly dependent on a very secure central unit that is able to issue certificates or link devices
to keys, but also for distributed schemes it has large overhead for handshake and consequent au-
thentication.
The solution falls onto symmetric cryptography as it is more efficient to provide the same level
of security towards brute force attacks. The algorithm most widely implemented is AES although
triple DES is also used for some applications. The AES encryption is so widely used, that it is
constantly reviewed by the most diverse users and developers.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) also called Rijndael, after its creators, was issued
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 2001, after a public procurement which
chose between a series of very competitive algorithms in terms of security, performance and fea-
tures. Intended for commercial and governmental applications, this block cipher aimed to replaced
DES the most used symmetric encryption solution at the time. AES became relevant due to several
of its characteristics, some of which not so well known such as resistance to linear and differential
cryptanalysis.
This algorithm is not only symmetric but easily reversible, using the key in a reverse order
when in reverse mode. It not only uses key encryption but also implements confusion, diffusion
and non-linearity. There are two main steps a key expansion and the encryption mechanism. The
key expansion creates from one 4x4 16 byte matrix, 10 others. The AES rounds iterate throughout
several blocks of operations, mostly equal when comparing, but with some particularities on the
last round. The key and input blocks constituted by 16 bytes are disposed in matrices of 4x4, the
purpose being to facilitate the algebra operations, both the key and input text.
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The algorithm starts out by expanding the key provided by the user, followed by an iterative
process that takes the following steps:
• In the last column of the last key matrix the first byte is changed to last
• Running the reordered column through a substitution box.
• The substituted column is XOR’d with a round specific constant, a set specific for each
round of processing, and then with the first column of the previous key matrix.
• To complete the other 3 columns it is just needed to XOR the correspondent column in the
previous key matrix with the first column already obtained.
• Repeat the process to create the remaining 9 blocks.
Secondly, both the key and input text are disposed in a matrix 4x4, a block constituted by 16
bytes, the purpose is not only to facilitate but also to maximise the efficiency the algebra opera-
tions. Following this, to create the input of the first block they are XOR’d. After the generation
of the extended 160 byte key to start working the input text, AES implements several rounds of
operations each composed by 4 blocks, the blocks affect the input with the following operations:
• Substitute bytes: makes use of the s-box making for a byte-by-byte substitution which re-
sults in the introduction of confusion into the output.
• Shift Rows: using a matrix disposition for row circular shift which results in the introduction
of diffusion into the output.
• Mix Columns: using finite fields Arithmetic which results in the introduction of diffusion
into the output.
• Add Round Key: Bitwise XOR with portion of the expanded key
Finite field arithmetic makes use of a 8 bit polynomial representation bytes in multiplication,
addition and division operations over the finite field GF(28). Like in a clock, the operations are
done within the finite chosen set. Arithmetic follows new rules for this binary variation. In AES
this is achieved using a irreducible polynomial m(x) = x8+ x4+ x3+ x+1. Finite field arithmetic
is used in the construction of the s-box for substitute bytes and the mix columns steps.
After resolving the encryption algorithm to use, there are some parameters to specify the key
size being the main one. Since there is a trade off between key size and performance the minimum
key size of 128 bit was embraced in order to minimize performance impact. If the desire for an
increase of security level arises, for any reason from better devices to less performance requisites
256bit or even 512bit can be easily implemented.
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3.3.4 Authentication
Authentication is granted via handshake and intrinsic session establishment. The nuance is that
the handshake can only be achieved by previously known users, which are set by previous contact
exchanged. This idea is derived from chat applications that use the number as identifier, where the
server matches the contact list with already existing contacts, applying the key agreement in [11],
expanding the number into a bigger secret. In a similar way to stretching and salting [19], here
in the form of password based encryption as in the standard RFC2898, used for example in WEP
router security. Although recognising the weaknesses of it, WEP can be useful if the initiation
vector problem is corrected.
The message exchange for a mutual authentication of A and B, any couple of users, is depicted
in Figure 3.4 where:
• IV - Initiation Vector
• Xnumber - Phone number of user X
• TS# - Time Stamp #
• MAC - Message Authentication Code
• KEY -
• #...# - Encrypted information
3.3.4.1 Decryption
Decryption is the critical part of the handshake protocol, its relevance is tremendous because only
successful decryption will mean that the user is known and consequently identifying it, establish-
ing a key and engaging in a conversation.
Firstly, a user will only engage in a session, try to decrypt or reply, with another user if the
last identifying numbers XX on his username, JohnDoeXX, correspond to any of the terminations
on their contacts address list. This condition is complemented by a selection of contacts from
the address list of the possible candidates for User ID. This will make a substantial reduction in
the candidates comparing to an average sized address list. The probability analysis done in the
previous Section shows that most likely there will be only a few candidates to User ID. Secondly,
as shown in Figure 3.5, hello messages will be exchanged with plausible candidates in an attempt
to initiate a session.
Once return messages are received and the existing candidates condition is fulfilled the user
will make use of the Initiation Vector included, in clear, at the beginning of the encrypted message
and combine it with one of the several contact matches in the key expansion obtaining a possibly
correct decryption key.
In decryption the requesting phone will try to guess the counterpart user ID and PN. The pro-
cess starts by generating the key, it makes use of the of the Initiation Vector and the Phone Number.
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User A User B
Message1
From A to B|Hello|TS1
Message2
IV|#Bnumber|TS1|TS2|MAC#
Message3
IV|#Anumber|TS2|TS3|MAC#
Message4
IV|#KEY|TS3|TS4|MAC#
Figure 3.4: Message Exchange
Message decryption follows and the process consists, like in any AES decryption, of a inverted
AES algorithm using the previously obtained key also inverted. For each of the candidates, after
the decryption process is completed, the first 30 bits are compared with the candidate’s phone
number. In case of a match between the candidate chosen and JohnDoeXX it indicates a success-
ful decryption. Otherwise the candidate and JohnDoeXX do not correspond and the process has
to be restarted with another of the candidates.
In case of success the name JohnDoeXX should be replaced by the contact’s name and session
establishment procedures continue.
3.3.4.2 Initialization Vector
In some literature this element can also be called salt, a metaphor for the fact that it condiments
the security level of the key in a key expansion process. This publicly disseminated number
has value for its unpredictability, consequently causing the previous guesses by malicious users
vain attempts at cracking the algorithm. Furthermore, this information goes in clear text over the
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Figure 3.5: Decryption scheme architecture
network making it possible for anyone to capture it and try to map the vector generation in order
to predict the next values.
Therefore the initialization vector is one of the vulnerabilities of this algorithm if not properly
configured, and so some directives need to be created in order to achieve the desired security level.
Firstly, this vector should be a random number, which must not be generated simply starting
in 0 and incrementing it with every use. It should not resemble a counter not only due to the
probable low number of generations done by devices but also due to the constant re-initializations
that would make it very predictable or even cyclical within a small closed set. Secondly, first
boot should be regarded and randomness guaranteed. Thirdly, the seed feed mechanism should be
secure, quick and inaccessible. Finally, the source of the seed should guarantee high entropy and
size as no truly random seed exists.
Special attention should be paid to the weaknesses such as the first boot, where the algorithm
is most predicable, implementation flaws, feed mechanisms, where information is vulnerable from
attackers, and the entropy limitations of the sources.
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One could question the fact of sending in clear a IV or even having one in the first place. To
those doubts it should first be presented the fact that the IV going in clear is essential for the key
generation and the ability of a receiver to replicate it, which means every attacker can do it and that
is why a information analysis of our anonymity solution was done. Secondly the IV introduces
independence to every authentication process. Accepting the assumption that the IV generation is
truly random, it will be, at least, very close and fulfils the requirements preventing the weaknesses
above stated, and since the number generation is device specific it can also be said to be user-pair
and time specific. Due to its uniqueness, it is unrepeatable in the future.
3.3.4.3 Key expansion
The process starts with a 30 bit phone number and an initialization vector which will be expanded
into a 128 bit key. In order to accomplish this, a key generator is used that takes in two values, in
this case the phone number and a initiation vector, outputting a pseudo random value which will
constitute the key for the encryption. In some cases this is called key stretching or key derivation,
implemented for instance in WEP, WPA.
Since the phone number is an already known value, pre shared between acquaintances, it can
be considered private information from the perspective of an unknown attacker, also the initializa-
tion vector guidelines are detailed above due to the vulnerability it represents. The key expansion
is where the encryption key is generated both for encryption and decryption for both users.
This process accomplishes several of the scheme objectives. Not only does it make the key
dependent on the phone number but also allowing for another user with the contact and IV to
obtain the key. This will also increase the algorithm’s complexity (takes more time to obtain the
key) and security, taking longer for an attacker to guess the key from the IV alone.
The algorithm, as explained above, takes a 9 digit phone number and a 160 bit initialization
vector processing them through the SHA1 160 bit hash function over N times. The chosen function
is SHA1 since it is the most implemented and secure hash algorithm, as was detailed in Section
2.2.3. Concerning the alternative of using standard encryption function as a reproducible process
with more processing time hence increased security towards a brute force attack, it is revealed a
problem, its reversibility which does not affect the hash function that has irreversibility as one its
main properties. Besides it was concluded that the larger the N used, the higher the security level
will be achieved.
3.3.4.4 Time Stamp
When talking about security it is crucial to keep track of the event sequence, maintaining users
updated on each step of the process, at the same time maintaining time windows for operations,
proportional to the normal computing time of a every step of the process. To achieve this security
complementary requisites it is necessary to maintain a log of the time and corresponding events
rejecting messages that come out of context even if authentic. Although very important for cre-
ating log and securing communication time stamps are not a cryptographic tool as they do not
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Figure 3.6: Key expansion schematic
involve any complex operations besides collecting the time from devices and synchronising them.
The key factor is that devices should be synchronized either using a common authority or by each
other, if not this the problem should be avoided by using both the users times separately calculat-
ing the difference between messages and comparing this with the standard operation time. This
last resort, although less secure and precise, is less demanding of users devices but requires the
systematization of times for all message processing and communication.
3.3.4.5 Message Authentication Code
So as to reassure users of the integrity of messages and to impede them from disclaiming message
origin, the MAC is included in the authentication messages.
The MAC is an encrypted version of the hashed message, this assures non repudiation through
the use of a key that is user and message specific. After extracting the MAC and decrypting it
using the message key, the receiver can regenerate it from the rest of the message. By comparison
it can be ascertained the message as forged, in case of mismatch the message is rejected because.
The use of the MAC verifies message content and its origin verifying that it has not been forged
or tampered with.
3.3.4.6 Scalability
Scalability is an important factor for a network security scheme to be viable in bigger networks
with more devices. In the specific case of the used scheme it is talked about mutual authentica-
tion which can escalate very quickly, proportionally to the number of users joining the network.
Therefore it was chosen the idea introduced in [13], the implementation of a upper bound for
simultaneous authentication without previous timeout or success. Through this mechanism it is
avoided the overloading of devices by the creation of bogus users even if by one single device.
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3.4 Resume
To sum up this chapter, the major vulnerabilities in ad-hoc are analysed from the perspective
of prevention. The design of a scheme to achieve security through anonymity in discovery and
privacy in communication is elaborated with the establishment of an anonymity solution and also
an authentication mechanism to allow the identification of known acquaintances. Furthermore it
was studied the necessary tools and mechanisms (MAC, timestamp, encryption, PRNG and Hash)
that help prevent the malicious intents of attackers.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
The implementation of the designed security scheme was done in Android devices which required
the application to be developed in Java code language and the developers tool is Eclipse. Android
devices’ hardware fulfils requirements to execute all the communication and security operations.
This enabled the implementation of the solution designed which demonstrates in practice the prin-
ciples and mechanisms upon which the scheme was designed. The implementation intends to
prove its real world application, validity and reliability.
The implementation can be broken down into two levels, a distributed multicast DNS service
and a anonymity and privacy security scheme. Like any multicast DNS server, there is the need for
service publishing and discovery. As a result, every device needs to be divulging its own service
through the network and at the same time listening for service updates trying to resolve them into
devices and maybe known users. Hence, the used library is JmDNS which contains the necessary
tools to implements the required services, listener, advertisement and register. For the second part,
the designed authentication and encryption scheme was used that enabled the successful discovery
of acquaintances from mobile phone numbers.
4.1 Android OS
The Android linux based operating system is an open source solution predominant in mobile de-
vices such as cellphones and tablets. The availability to the general public makes its implemen-
tation possible in any compatible machine, since it is also an open platform coders can submit
modifications to the existing code. To help developers, Android has several programming guides
as well as guidelines. This way software developers can maintain or at least approach Google’s
criteria.
In order to develop the Android application, Google provides a bundle that includes eclipse
version and SDK including drivers and tools specific for their technology in an adaptation of the
programming tool Eclipse. It consists of a very interactive and reliable platform that allows for the
creation of all necessary elements, such as classes and interfaces.
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4.2 Application
4.2.1 Views
The views constitute one of the main features and challenges of Android as a touch based OS it
must have functional and clear interfaces.
4.2.1.1 Number Validation
In order to obtain the user’s phone number, users are asked to insert it correctly in this screen. This
simple interface provides users with a text, explaining why validation is so important, accompanied
by a editable text (EditText) field, that allows the user to intuitively insert the number.
4.2.1.2 Contacts Interface
Contacts are the main view in the application, it is here users most interact with the application
configuring it and receiving most of the output. Due to the localization limitation of a mesh
network and the likely modest amount of contacts per user, their presentation is done by fragments.
This has the advantage of being simpler than list view, at the same time being able to show a big
number of items with good performance. The contact list and data is taken from an adapter, a
necessary element in the fragment, that translates and updates the data on the available contacts
list.
4.2.1.3 ChatView
The ChatView interface makes use of a relative layout, it allows for the use of different areas
located relative to each other. This proves important to present the traditional chat screen with
conversation on top and message sending on the bottom. The bottom part includes a EditText field
and a send button that enables users to write and send messages from here. At the same time, it
contains a frame for a listview where message history is displayed. Like the fragment list, also
listview has the need for an adapter, that formats and updates information, presenting it in the
design intended.
4.2.2 Number Validation
The number validation is done in a user trust process, where the users are asked to input their
number while alerted to the fact that they will be identified by it. Complementary methods can
be implemented in the future to reassure the integrity of the phone number, at the time it was
somewhat redundant in our security tests, as it was outside the scope to certify the authenticity.
Also, it would need a central authority and some complex process, that establishes calls or sends
text messages. Here the number is subject to a prefix +3519, mandatory as it should be Portuguese,
but configurable for other environments. This number should then be saved, as an application
setting, accompanied by a flag for number validated, recognisable on future application initiations.
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4.3 Serverless XMPP
This is the Internet Engineering Task Force standard for message exchange, used in big appli-
cations like the google talk or facebook messenger. For the application, the JmDNS library was
found, constructed in Java language. It implements both DNS-SD and mDNS the building blocks
for a serverless XMPP application. The library’s architecture creates the threads and manages
them so that the service maintains the advertising and listening functionalities active.
The JmDNS library makes use of a listener, which purpose is to resolve network DNS events
when listening to multicast service announcements. This announcements include added service,
removed service or resolved service.
4.3.1 Multicast lock and IP address
The implementation requires the execution of network operations in the main thread which is by
default not allowed by the OS, in order to maintain network connectivity integrity. To resolve
this problem, thread policy safe mode is disabled, allowing all alterations on the activity main
thread. Following the lifting of the restrictions, the multicast lock is configured on the wifi to
allow the service announcement to be disseminated continuously. Next and last, it is important
to retrieve the IP address from the device to establish both the DNS record and socket set up that
make communication with other users possible.
4.3.2 JmDNS
There is the need for a JmDNS object creation to interact via serverless XMPP protocol. The
competence of the JmDNS allows us to relax about lower layers of communication and focus on
upper level results, extracting the necessary information from the DNS registers also engaging in
authentication.
The DNS record has to be created so that the service can be divulged by multicastDNS.
JmDNS implements the register that manages announcements, using the mDNS mechanisms. The
DNS-SD mechanism is implemented in the listener, it manages multithread services discovery,
dealing with respective responses and implications.
The following constitute configurations to respond to the DNS service operations.
4.3.2.1 DNS-SD
In order to resolve DNS announcements, a DNS service discovery must be used. In this library,
it takes the form of a listener that responds to three types of events for a specific service, in this
case presence, present in announcements: service added, service resolved and service removed.
Each of this services triggers a specific event that can be customized according to the implemented
protocol. Moreover, the service will find itself as a result of multicast so it is important to prevent
device from adding itself as a contact.
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For the service added event, the device needs to ask for extra information so that the service
is resolved into a more complete TXT record. When the TXT record is retrieved, service resolved
is launched, the authentication process should be triggered and then a temporary contact must be
created. This should include the basic data available: username, IP address, port and service type,
as a complement services are indexed according to their discovery sequence. Lastly, once service
removed event is recognised the corresponding user should be removed as new authentication will
be necessary to revalidate device data.
4.3.2.2 mDNS
Firstly, it should be explained that after number validation, using the obtained phone number
termination, a pseudonym is generated, like detailed in Subsection 3.3.1, this will constitute the
username identifier on the DNS record. Furthermore, the DNS record uses the previously obtained
pseudonym and IP address, together with the pre-defined presence service type and port. This
record is used to register the service on the network and attempt to divulge it.
4.3.2.3 Exiting
There needs to be launched the service removed message so that contacts are aware that the user
left the network. This will allow for contact exclusion form lists and latter reinsertion free of
issues.
4.3.3 Contact
This class encloses all the necessary information for a service on the network. Every user within
the network that publicises a service becomes a Contact. For each, an object is created that saves
the user’s details obtained not only from the DNS record but also the authentication process and
messaging history. The fields include DNS and contact information phone number and username
(both altered during the authentication process if known), IP address, port, service, index number
identifier, also a list of messages (conversation history) and a list of values, kept for security,
including tiemstamps, flags and the symmetric key.
4.3.4 Message
Message class is used to standardize every message to the stanza format. This way it should in-
clude the destination and origin, as well as the main content or payload. Also a time stamp is added
during the content processing, this way the conversation history can be retrieved chronologically.
Of course, there is a clear need for clearing user history after every session.
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4.3.5 Socket
Due to the nature of the authentication, where communication can be interrupted before a device
can identify the user on the other end, it was chosen a communication message by message pro-
cess, where instead of a socket tunnel it is established a connection per message. This inefficient
way provides the necessary message independence for more secure authentication, useful for short
term communication.
Using TCP protocol the basic elements that enable communication are the receiver’s server-
socket, together with the sender and receiver sockets. The first that in possession of the necessary
port and IP information, attempts to send a message. The receiver’s serversocket listens for at-
tempts of information exchange on a specific port and IP address, information that is available in
the DNS record. When a communication attempt is recognised by the serversocket, it generates a
socket object, configured with the addressing parameters, to read the incoming message.
The sockets can send and receive strings through a PrintWriter and a BufferedReader, respec-
tively, these tools work the information circulating between the established socket ends.
In the socket according to the contacts authentication state a message is processed or not.
4.4 Scheme
4.4.1 Contact Retrieval
The first step towards this security scheme’s implementation is the contact list of number and
name retrieval, only this way it is possible to search through the list for those who may match the
user’s pseudonym. This step has to be taken by the activity, as it needs a context, non existent
in parallel threads, to perform the querry to the SQL-Lite database of the Android device. There,
data is retrieved through a Content URI, in the specific case of the contacts it is the ContactsCon-
tract.Contact. The query also allows, like any SQL derivation should, extra fields for conditions
and projections.
The nuance is that contacts are structured in an hierarchical linked table fashion that makes
the access to number information impossible, if not through specific contact fields, which creates
the need for a previous list of names lookup. In other words, one must first retrieve all the names
and certify that each one of them has a number, only then retrieve their numbers. For exclusion
purposes the field HAS_PHONE_NUMBER can be used in the contacts. It is not viable to do a
query for every user that enters the network as lookup by phone number is a complex multi level
process. For all this, a vector is retrieved every time the activity starts. This vector that contains
the names and numbers of every contact will make the lookup easier and quicker.
4.4.2 MAC
MAC is available in Android with the use of a key, it hashes the content of the message and
authenticates it. A one way operation, to be repeated upon the message receive, which will attest to
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the content’s integrity. This process is achieved with the encryption key, which will re-authenticate
the message.
4.4.3 Timestamp
All the timestamps in the application are taken from the system clock, assuming that Android will
independently verify its synchronization. Due to its several synchronization mechanisms: GPS,
local NTP server, NTP server from google and cellular network.
The system clock in milliseconds helps the OS to maintain a record of the proper functioning
of the device. It is also used, in our case, to prevent replay attacks, discarding every message
that comes after timeout. This step takes into account possible delays in the various parts of the
system, like for example the decoding of an encrypted message, which can need some time to go
through all the possible numbers, but at the same time rejects the messages that may have been
constructed after long brute force attacks.
4.4.4 PRNG
SecureRandom is a security and cryptography oriented Pseudo Random Number Generator [20],
which enables applications with the generation of specially independent and unpredictable byte
arrays. This will be used in both Initiation Vector and Symmetric keys generation.
4.4.5 Key expansion
Key expansion is as designed in the previous chapter. The used mechanism is Password Based
Encryption, a mechanism usually used in encrypting information for storage, more specifically
passwords, hence the name. The key feature is the reproducibility of the process, same input same
output. The Android class has the advantage of allowing for different parameter specifications like
key length and the algorithm. In this case, 128 bit SHA1.
4.4.6 AES encryption
SecretKey is the key type implemented, the Android class for symmetric cryptographic key ob-
jects. There is the need to create a SecretKeySpec object that allows the generation of an SecretKey
from a byte array.
The Cipher class implements the encoding and decoding modes for cryptographic functions,
allowing for the transformation with different key sizes, in this case AES 128 bit.
4.4.7 Message exchange
The nature of the messages is random text and therefore each device has to keep track of the
authentication process. Only this will achieve the identification of the kind of message entering
the system and initiate a proper message processing, as we can see in Figure 4.1. This is crucial
for devices to know their current authentication state and gain the ability to block the process and
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the counterparts. A counterpart will be blocked if during the process does not reply within timeout
or has no match in the address book. Table 4.1 shows the flags and values that are set or registered
during each of the four different messages assembly. This will allow devices to distinguish the
message and initiate a different process to digest it.
Figure 4.1: Message Exchange
It is important to highlight the fact that UTF8 is not a viable String encoding for random
numbers as it does not cover many combinations of bytes. It encodes several combinations into a
default unknown value that then decodes, again, to a unique default value. This is a critical fact
for strings, which values can take any random value, either because they are encrypted or truly
random. Therefore base64 encoding was used, which provides a full correspondence between
byte array and String, guaranteeing the correct translation between the sent data stream and the
received one when decoding it.
4.4.7.1 Message assembly
Message assembly is done with different combinations of functions for each message that take
in the different data formats and output the messages in a string format. Here, the tools detailed
previously are put together to construct secure messages. The assembly starts by the content where
it is important to transform the encoding for base64 like stated above, putting together the pieces
48 Implementation
involves always the retrieval of Timestamps and the concatenation of different strings. During
each of the assembly processes, flags and values are set according to Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Message Assembly
A1 A2 A3 A4
SetName
SetPhoneNumber
SetTime1
SetTime2 +
SetTime3 + +
SetTime4 +
SetTime1_Sent
SetValidationInit +
SetValidated
SetMeValidated +
SetKEY
The first message goes in clear, consequently is the simplest just requiring the basic concate-
nation of strings. The second and third message are in every way similar starting by the basic
aggregation of strings. The timestamps are concatenated with the phone number to generate the
MAC. These three elements form the message payload, which will be encrypted. This is fol-
lowed by the encryption operation, that starts with the generation of a 128 bit IV, followed by the
key expansion, where the sender’s number, together with the IV, is expanded into the symmetric
encryption key. After being encrypted, this data is preceded by the IV, finalizing the message
generation. The fourth message is generated in an all similar way to the second and third, but it
has the detail of having the key in the place of the sender’s phone number, a 128 bit word that will
then be used to encrypt the exchanged of messages.
The regular message is appended with a time stamp, followed by the mac generation and
junction before being encrypted with the previously agreed upon key.
4.4.7.2 Message processing
The first step of message processing is knowing which of the types it is, otherwise digesting is
virtually impossible. A state has to be deducted from the set of flags and values available in
each contact. In Table 4.2 it can be found which of the flags are set in every moment of the
authentication.
To provide accurate identification, it is essential to use the flags and values of contacts. In
Table 4.3 it can be seen the flags and values set up in each of the message’s processing functions.
Like for assembly, also for processing it is necessary to keep different functions for digesting
the the different messages. The first message is of quick decoding, launching the generation
of message two. The second and third only differ in the response they trigger. They start by
extracting the possible contacts of the list, followed by the the IV form the message. Then the
iteration process commences, trying the existing combinations of number and IV one by one until
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Table 4.2: Authentication State
Normal M1 M2 M3 M4
SetName +
SetPhoneNumber +
SetTime1 + + +
SetTime2 + +
SetTime3 +
SetTime4
SetTime1_Sent + + +
SetValidationInit +
SetValidated + +
SetMeValidated +
KEY +
verifyHello +
Table 4.3: Message Digestion - during process
D1 D2 D3 D4
SetName + +
SetPhoneNumber + +
SetTime1 +
SetTime2 +
SetTime3 +
SetTime4 +
SetTime1_Sent +
SetValidationInit + +
SetValidated + + +
SetMeValidated + +
SetKEY
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either success or the end of the possibilities. For each attempt, the key is expanded and decryption
is attempted, checking then the content for success. In case of success there is the need to validate
the MAC and time interval, only if these two are correct the IP has a new username and phone
number matching. If in the message two, the message three is started; when in message three the
message four is assembled.
To process message four, it is very similar to the one of message two and three, with the
exception of taking the key out in the end of validation and updating it.
For a normal message, the digestion decrypts it with the symmetric key and validates both the
MAC and the message lifetime adding then the content to the chat.
If at any point the procedure fails authentication, it is abandoned because there is the possibility
of tampering, an unexpected mistake or the user is unknown.
4.4.7.3 Process management
Setting sight on the integrity of the authentication process and the guarantee that, by default,
devices acknowledge others as unknown users, operation timeouts are established. This way after
some time without response, devices outcasts the destination as an unknown.
4.5 Final Considerations
In short, there were various challenges faced from the first impression of java and Android to the
implementation of JmDNS and security scheme. Stackoverflow proved very useful throughout this
process, the exchange of knowledge by the clarification of doubts, shows that many of them are
recurrent and makes this is a exceptionally relevant resource for everyone programming. Security
tools are already immensely developed and intuitive but complex to use and combine requiring a
lot effort and time.
Chapter 5
Result Analysis
5.1 Serverless XMPP
A successful implementation was achieved as detailed in the previous chapter. The beginning of
the application is depicted in Figure 5.1a when for user JohnDoe57 information is still loading and
in Figure 5.1b, where for user JohnDoe74 the initial screen is shown. In both cases there is a first
instance showing the used pseudonym.
(a) Loading screen (b) Initial screen
Figure 5.1: Application start
As a result of service discovery a contacted is added as depicted in Figure 5.2a. If one intends
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for message exchange and clicks over a user, the activity chat view, is initiated. This one enables
users to input their messages and send them as shown in Figure 5.2b. Although this is just an
illustrative example of the interface all the characteristics are present. For instance every message
is a listview element where the content is preceded by the sender’s name.
(a) After discovery (b) Chat view
Figure 5.2: Application start
5.2 Security scheme
In order to provide proof of the message interchange and mutual authentication between two users,
the packet exchange for the process is captured and provided here on Figure 5.3. Followed by
packet payload data as detailed in Figures 5.5, 5.6a, 5.6b and 5.6c. Data from packet 1 is the only
one with intelligible information hence it is shown separately in Figure 5.5. The devices used were
Samsung Nexus S that according to the maker possess a 1GHz processor, this is the main feature
influencing the decryption times.
The users according to the developed scheme are JohnDoe74 with phone number +351917294074
matching the name Filipinho in the address book and JohnDoe57 generated from the number
+351917916657 matching the name Daniel Shota in the address book. Wireless mesh network
has IP addressing starts in IP 169.254.0.0 and uses the mask 255.255.0.0 . The users have the
IP addresses 169.254.1.27 for JohnDoe57 and 169.354.1.134 for JohnDoe74. The result of the
authentication from user perspective can be seen in Figure 5.4. There is a duplicate of the fourth
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authentication message in the contact Filipinho which is added when authentication is concluded,
a plausible explanation is that the application is assuming it as a regular message, every flag is
already set and the state of the contact’s authentication is authenticated, appending it to the chat as
can be seen in Figure 5.4b.
Figure 5.3 confirms that we are dealing with TCP traffic.
The sequence is initiated by JohnDoe74 sending the message, a XMPP stanza, to JohnDoe57
with the hello message as content. A special character set is appended "#!*39$#" to help the
message identification, as depicted in Figure 5.5. This is the smaller packet size due to the non
inclusion of an IV, a big element that weighs on the rest of the packages.
Messages 2, 3 and 4 are encrypted as shown in Figures 5.6a, 5.6b and 5.6c this goes to show
that information looks random and is unintelligible.
As can be analysed from the packet capture from JohnDoe74 depicted in Figure 5.3 the process
is very fast not lasting more than half a second, the first message goes out at 36.902 and the last one
comes in at 37.37. Another factor that allows us to arrive at this estimation is that, each user only
sends an answer after processing the previously received message. Moreover, there is no answer
if a match is not found. The authentication was successful as every message was exchanged and
both users have found a match for the number in their address book, also the key was exchanged.
It is important to highlight that the interval between messages 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 are the times
that include decryption and transport time therefore being the closest measure to the decryption
process. These times intervals take the values of 0.170662 and 0.160113 respectively for messages
2 to 3 and 3 to 4. Since the Wireshark is taken from JohnDoe74 which sent the message one and
three, it can be considered that the first time would be closer to the real decryption. This is justified
by the fact that is the time between the reception of message two and the sending of message
three. To make a conservative conclusion we can consider that the time of decryption is under 160
milliseconds. Because this interval includes not only the decryption time but also transport time
and message assembly. Due to the imprecise nature of Wireshark as a measuring tool this value
establishes the order of magnitude of the time. The transport time is consider negligible. This
assumption is supported by the fact that the processing time for message two is smaller than the
processing and transport of message three.
For the time extracted and for the used pseudonym, a brute force attack would take nearly
1 month, 37.04 days, to be accomplished by a similar device. But even if attempted by a more
powerful machine that could do it one hundred times faster it would take more than half a day,
8.89 hours.
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Figure 5.3: Wireshark packet view compacted
5.2 Security scheme 55
(a) Resolved authentication on user John-
Doe74
(b) Resolved authentication on user John-
Doe57
Figure 5.4: Authentication result
Figure 5.5: Packet data - message 1
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(a) packet data - message 2
(b) packet data - message 3
(c) packet data - message 4
Figure 5.6: Packet data
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
The extensive work developed bore fruits as was exhibited in the previous chapter. Throughout
this document, supported by a detailed analysis, authentication with our security scheme was
concluded viable.
To start out, it should be highlighted that, as proposed, the security scheme was designed and
implemented. Moreover, a security analyses was conducted, to assure that the attack vulnerabili-
ties were prevented successfully.
Furthermore, the serverless XMPP was successfully implemented on Android environment
enabling message exchange through TCP between users. The application was built on top of a
wireless mesh network creator that guarantees connectivity, as detailed in [2]. The service infor-
mation exchange was key to communication establishment. The central pieces were broadcast and
discovery, through the mechanisms of mDNS and DNS-SD, respectively.
The viability of a password or identifier based scheme was confirmed for the specific case of
the phone number. Furthermore, for a unique ID like an email or company number security is even
increased, due to their higher amount of information. This characteristic makes the scheme highly
adaptable to various contexts and applications.
Moreover, security level on the scheme is proportional to the amount of digits revealed in
the pseudonym and the number of iterations which translates into the amount of time per key
expansion. These are factors that influence the resistance against a brute force attacks, rising with
the less digits revealed and the more iterations per expansion. Consequently, the second lowest
possible amount of digits was used in the pseudonym in order to decrease decryption processing
time. On the other hand an average number of iterations was implemented, in the key expansion.
The scheme’s parameter reconfigurability can be adjusted to accomplish increases in the re-
sistance time towards brute force attack, hence achieving greater levels of security. The main pro-
cesses are employing bigger sets of bits (256 or 512) at the same time in encryption and PRNG.
In the context at work, performance was prioritized consequently only 128 bit encryption was
implemented.
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Another aspect to focus is the security scheme’s dependence on the phone number integrity
and random IV generation. Therefore preventive measures were taken in both cases because they
are main vulnerabilities of our scheme.
The tradeoff between security level and performance is the biggest challenge of design and it
was crucial to always weight the pros and cons of every choice.
Lastly, this decentralized security scheme without certificates is of great adaptability since it
can use trivial already known information to recognise a users, at the same time it can guarantee
the privacy of users.
6.2 Future Work
Even with the big amount of work there are still a lot of uncovered ground in securing mesh
networks. The future work could be developed in two ways that push the user experience further,
security, services.
Regarding security and as exposed in Chapter 2, lower layers are a vulnerability of mesh net-
works therefore security solutions could be developed to prevent and discourage attacks. Simple
encryption of the data or the adaptation of one of the schemes in Chapter 2 is suggested.
Moreover, collaborative and decentralized network can provide better performance and reli-
ability to communication. It is important to have some sort of traceability and exclusion mech-
anisms to impede malicious users from interfering with others as well as the network’s correct
behaviour. Accountability is also relevant because anonymous users feel to some extent a sense of
impunity.
As far as the service is concerned, there are some extra improvements that could make the
difference for a more attractive application. Firstly, integrated mesh generation allowing every
user to join a specific network or generate it, if it can not be found. This transforms the application
into a more practical tool, it would also encourage not so technical users. Secondly, multihop
connectivity would increase network’s range, throughput and reliability. Moreover, IP generation
should be automatic and random to avoid security liabilities. Thirdly, the application built here
allows for the exchange of messages with other users, and cover the basic functionalities to validate
our design, in the future users could be provided with extra functionalities like the inclusion of a
picture, the exchange of files or even the options for voice and video calls. Lastly, the user should
be able to add from the application user data and engage in communication.
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